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ABSTRACT 
GOLD AND DISPLACEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE: 
RISKS AND UNCERTAINTY AT ROŞIA MONTANĂ  
The Canadian-Romanian gold mining project at Roşia Montanǎ in Romania is 
known as the largest opencast gold mine being planned now in Europe. It involves the 
displacement  of  several  thousand  inhabitants,  mostly  former  gold  miners  and  a 
smaller number of farmers. The land and houses of more than three quarters of this 
population have already been acquired by the project owners, although the project has 
not  yet  received  its  formal  environmental  clearance.  The  paper  analyzes  the  risks 
facing  the  displaced  population  of  Roşia  Montană,  employing  as  analytical 
methodology the Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model, developed 
by Michael M. Cernea. The paper argues for an expansion of the IRR model. By 
taking into account the macro (extralocal) forces that shape displacement and paying 
closer  attention  to  the  micro  (subjective)  experience  of  this  process,  it  becomes 
possible to understand the effects of uncertainty and vulnerability in displacement. 
The author’s participant observations and in-depth interviews with local families are 
complemented with secondary analyses of data from several other socio-economic 
surveys and with the analysis of the Resettlement and Relocation Action Plan of the 
project owners.  
 
Keywords:  Displacement,  risks,  IRR  model,  uncertainty,  vulnerability, 
peripheralization. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the social and economic risks generated by a proposed 
large-scale mining project to be carried out in the gold-rich area of Roşia Montană, 
Romania, by a Canadian – Romanian corporation. While the project has not yet 
been approved by the Romanian authorities, the project developers have already 
acquired the properties of three quarters of the households whose land is needed for 
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the project. The article captures only the initial stages and the most apparent trends 
of an ongoing and complex process of mining-induced displacement. 
Populations  displaced  by  mining  projects  face  specific  challenges  as  rich 
mineral deposits are discovered in areas where land is relatively inexpensive and 
opencast mining is the most cost-effective method of extraction. Such deposits are 
often located in regions of high population density in which land tenure is poorly 
defined,  residents  depend  on  subsistence  agriculture  and  are  politically 
disempowered (Downing 2002: 6). When displaced by large mines, individuals or 
whole  villages  face  the  risk  of  impoverishment  as  described  by  Cernea’s 
Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model
1. However, the last two 
decades have brought some important changes and added complexity to the world-
wide phenomenon of involuntary displacement.  
First, the fall of state socialism has enabled mining companies to expand into 
Eastern Europe, attracted by the mineral bounty of the Carpathian mountain range 
(Danielson, 2005). Mining in this area, that is now part of the European Union 
(EU), poses specific challenges for companies due to higher land prices, stricter 
environmental regulations and growing social expectations.  
Second, in addition to the project developers and the local populations to be 
displaced, a new category of actors has emerged on the scene: environmental and 
human  rights  NGOs.  These  have  become  increasingly  successful  in  delaying 
resource-extraction projects in different countries
2. This has also happened at Roşia 
Montană.  The  NGOs  opposing  the  new  mine  have  managed,  beyond  many 
people’s expectations, to bring the environmental approval process to a standstill. 
However, the grassroots base of the opposition has declined over the years as many 
families received compensations for their properties and left the area
3 while others 
do not find their interests represented by the opposing NGOs.  
Both  circumstances  mentioned  above  have  a  strong  bearing  on  the 
displacement process and its outcomes. The growing real estate market in Romania 
and the sustained opposition have compelled the project developers to provide, 
lately, substantially increased compensations for properties. These have reduced 
the  risk  of  decapitalization  for  those  who  have  already  relocated  from  Roşia 
Montană before the project was put on hold. The residents who still live in the area 
were left to struggle with a host of uncertainties because the fate of the mining 
project itself is undecided. Roşia Montană is considered ‘one of the world's few 
remaining undeveloped giant gold deposits’ (Casey, 2006: 2). Even if the project is 
suspended, it is unlikely that the $9.2 billion
4 bonanza will remain in the ground for 
long. This casts a long shadow of uncertainty over Roşia Montană.  
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In order to account for this diversity of resettlement experiences I will enrich 
the IRR  model by taking into account the macro- and micro-social contexts in 
which the Roşia Montană displacement takes place. I will show how extralocal 
influences shape the impoverishment risks described by the IRR model and how 
this, in turn, is reflected in the lived experience of the displacees.  
The description of the Roşia Montană case is followed by the outline of the 
theoretical framework. The next section focuses on the macro-level processes that 
create the conditions for vulnerability in the Roşia Montană area. This is followed 
by  the  description  of  the  data  and  its  collection.  In  the  “Analysis  and 
Interpretation”  section,  I  introduce  the  micro-social  context  of  the  resettlement 
experience. This is followed by an analysis of the issue of ‘successful relocation’, 
of  compensation  and  of  six  impoverishment  risks  from  the  IRR  model
5,
  with 
particular emphasis on the links between extralocal processes and their subjective 
interpretation.  To  ensure  comparability,  I  point  out  some  similarities  with 
development-induced displacements in other countries.  
THE CASE IN BRIEF 
Roşia Montană is a cluster of 16 villages located in the Western Carpathians 
of Romania. Administratively, Roşia Montană belongs to Alba county (the county 
capital is Alba Iulia), has a population of 3600 (2006) and is surrounded by the 
towns of Abrud and Câmpeni, and by several other villages (University 1 December, 
1918
6: 19). In what follows, a distinction is drawn between ‘displacees’ and the 
local  population.  The  former  refers  to  those  inhabitants  of  Roşia  Montană  and 
Abrud whose land has been earmarked for acquisition while the latter refers to all 
other  residents  of  Roşia  Montană  and  the  surrounding  area,  who  live  in  close 
proximity to the project footprint but are not eligible for compensation.     
Roşia  Montană  has  been  a  famous  gold  mining  area  since  Roman  times. 
Mining has been carried out with varying intensity over the centuries until 1948 
when all the private mines were nationalized by the socialist state. Beginning in 
1970,  the  socialist  state  enterprise  commenced  open  pit  exploitation  which 
occurred, even after the fall of the socialist regime (1989), until 2006.  
In  the  1990s,  the  mineral  and  energy  resources  of  Eastern  Europe 
increasingly attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) to this region (Castells, 1996: 
136).  The  Toronto-based  mining  company  Gabriel  Resources  arrived  in  Roşia 
Montană in 1997. Together with the state-owned enterprise Minvest Deva, Gabriel 
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Resources formed the Roşia Montană Gold Corporation (RMGC)
7, which intends 
to develop the largest open pit gold mine in Europe based on cyanide-in-leach 
technology. The surface needed for the project covers 1660 ha (RMGC, 2006a: 9). 
Since  2002,  the  company  has  commenced  the  acquisition  of  properties  of  974 
households residing within the project footprint. The Resettlement and Relocation 
Action Plan (RRAP) distinguishes between two forms of displacement: relocation 
and resettlement. Those opting for relocation have received compensation in the 
form of a lump sum which they have used to purchase a property at a location of 
their choice. For those who chose to be resettled, new houses will be built by the 
company at two new resettlement sites (Piatra Albă
8 and Dealul Furcilor
9). Until 
the new sites are constructed, the resettlers live in their houses in Roşia Montană 
(RMGC, 2006a).   
RMGC had applied for a $100 million loan from the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the private lending arm of the World Bank. The application for 
this loan was dropped in October 2002, but there are contradictory reasons given 
for the Bank’s refusal to finance the RMGC project. A World Bank spokesperson 
claimed that the decision was taken by James Wolfensohn, former World Bank's 
president due to ‘concerns about the project’s social and environmental impact’ 
(Beattie and McAleer, 2002: 13). According to IFC officials, however, the decision 
to withdraw was made due to the availability of private financing for the project 
(McAleer, 2003: 27).  
After securing private loans, RMGC submitted in 2006 the Environmental 
Impact  Assessment  (EIA)  report  to  the  Romanian  government.  However,  the 
NGOs opposing the project, headed by the local NGO ‘Alburnus Maior’ (AM), 
have launched legal challenges against the project, and in Fall 2007 succeeded in 
having a number of important certificates annulled by Romanian Courts of Appeal. 
As a result, the Romanian Ministry of the Environment decided to suspend the 
evaluation  process  for  the  EIA.  In  early  2008,  property  acquisitions  were 
discontinued and two thirds of the RMGC workforce was laid off.   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The  impoverishment  risks  caused  by  population  displacements  throughout 
the  world  have  been  the  focus  of  sociologists  and  anthropologists  for  several 
decades. Their research has been articulated in an analytical model known as the 
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Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (or IRR) model (Cernea, 1991, 2000, 
2008;  Cernea  and  Guggenheim,  1994).  Cernea’s  IRR  model  postulates  that 
involuntary  displacement  results  in  eight  impoverishment  risks:  landlessness, 
joblessness,  homelessness,  food  insecurity,  increased  morbidity  and  mortality, 
marginalization, social disarticulation, and loss of access to common property. The 
main strength of the IRR model is that it is both comprehensive and specific. It 
focuses on a broad range of possible risks and, being grounded in an impressive 
accumulation of empirical findings, it sensitizes researchers to specific forms of 
impoverishment.  This  makes  it  very  useful  for  a  multisided  exploration  of  the 
displacement process at Roşia Montană. The main weakness of the IRR model is 
the neglect of the broader political economic processes, which  cause and shape 
displacement in little understood ways. In addition, the model  pays insufficient 
attention to the subjective experience of displacement among affected populations 
(Dwivedi, 2002: 719). This study aims to build on the strengths of the IRR model 
and  overcome  its  limitations  by  exploring  the  displacement  process  at  Roşia 
Montană within its macro (extralocal) context and its micro (subjective) context.   
The main argument is that the displacees and the local population from Roşia 
Montană are exposed to a process of impoverishment which is both more complex 
and  more  uncertain  than  similar  instances  of  displacement  in  ‘Third  World’ 
contexts. To better identify this process I use the term vulnerability. Vulnerability 
refers to the relative inability of an individual or group to deal with the adverse 
effects stemming from environmental or technological change (Allen, 2003). It is 
the possibility ‘that a crisis may descend at any time, [and] not knowing whether 
one will cope’ (World Bank, 2001: 135). Exposure to risks becomes vulnerability 
when  the  outcomes  or  probabilities  of  risks  are  uncertain
10.  I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  
displacement, vulnerability is a form of impoverishment which may or may not 
materialize. Even in the absence of real impoverishment, uncertainty changes the 
everyday lives of displacees in significant ways.  
Uncertainty  plays  thus  an  important  role  in  understanding  the  subtle  and 
enduring  effects  of  involuntary  displacements.  For  example,  in  discussing 
resistance to displacement in the Sardar Sarovar project in India, Dwivedi (1999: 
46) points out that ‘paradoxical as it may seem, lack of information is a high risk’. 
In other instances, uncertainty becomes ‘chronic’, as in the case of the Gwembe 
people forcibly relocated by the construction of the Kariba Dam in Zambia in the 
1950s (Cliggett et al., 2007). 
Vulnerability  is  due  to  two  macro  processes  –  peripherialization  and 
individualization  –  which  shape  the  risks  of  the  IRR  model  in  specific  ways. 
Peripherialization and individualization do not necessarily work in tandem but can 
have contradictory effects on displacement risks.  
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The peripherialization of a local community means that its developmental 
path  comes  under  the  ever-stronger  influence  of  extralocal  forces.  In  the 
geographical literature, peripheries are defined by their dependence on decisions 
made in a centre of power and by the ‘distance’ (in both a spatial and a socio-
cultural  sense)  from  that  centre  (Waack,  2004a:  1).  Moreover,  communities 
exposed  to  peripherialization  experience  contradictory  pressures,  such  as  an 
increasing dependence on extralocal investments or markets and, concomitantly, 
depopulation and ever fewer indigenous resources to cope on their own with rapid 
technological and economic change.  
When discussed in relation to risks, individualization has two aspects. On the 
one hand, it means that the responsibility for dealing with risks is transferred from 
institutions to the individual (Beck, 2006: 336).  On the other hand, individuals 
face this new demand by searching for individual solutions to their problems, a 
trend  that  is  exacerbated  during  the  post-socialist  period  due  to  institutional 
instability (Genov, 2000: 542). Overall, individualization tends to make individuals 
more vulnerable.  
 
THE MACRO-SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ROŞIA MONTANĂ:  
VULNERABILITY IN AN EMERGING PERIPHERY 
 
To understand how a local population in Eastern Europe becomes vulnerable 
once it becomes exposed to extralocal influences, one needs to  look in several 
directions. First, it is important to consider the political economy of the global 
extractive  industry.  Second,  the  transition  context  of  post-socialist  Romania  is 
indispensable  for  understanding  the  pre-project  conditions  in  Roşia  Montanǎ. 
Third,  the  emergence  of  influential  transnational  NGOs  draws  attention  to  the 
growing power of extralocal actors to define local risks and uncertainties and the 
consequences of this process.  
In the mining literature it is generally agreed that mining is risky business. 
Modern mining requires large, capital-intensive operations with substantial start-up 
costs. Mineral prices are subject to large fluctuations on the world market, which 
affect the profitability of mining projects (Mikesell and Whitney, 1987: 31). This 
causes the well-known boom and bust cycles of economies dependent on mining 
(Clark and North, 2006: 3). Exploration is very high-risk because ore reserves can 
be overestimated or the quality of the ore might vary unexpectedly in different 
areas of the deposit (Mikesell and Whitney, 1987: 69). Cost overruns are very 
frequent in mining due to technical problems or administrative reasons. Even if the 
mine reaches its operational phase, it can still experience difficulties or a premature 
shut-down, not least because of political risks, such as unexpected changes in taxes 
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What are the social implications of these constraints on local communities? 
From a spatial point of view, the mining industry tends to crowd out the living 
space of local populations in order to use the environment as a supply depot and 
waste repository for its large-scale operations (see Figure 1). This spatial ‘conflict’ 
between the uses of the environment has negative economic implications. At Roşia 
Montanǎ,  for  example,  mining,  agriculture  and  forestry  have  offered  long-
established, complementary income opportunities (Waack, 2007). With the advent 
of a modern, large-scale project, the local economy is pushed towards dependence 
on a sole income source: mining.  
 
Figure 1 
The Three Competing Uses of the Environment in Roşia Montană:  
From Relative Harmony to Emerging Conflict. 
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Source: adapted from Dunlap (1993), cited in Hannigan (2006: 19). 
  
This profound intrusion into the spatial and economic fabric of community 
life stands in marked contrast to the limited engagement of mining companies in 
the  socio-economic  development  of  local  communities.  Transnational  mining 
projects tend to be organized as ‘enclaves’, separated from the rest of the national 
economy  (Clark  and  North,  2006).  In  most  cases,  operations  are  owned  by 
foreigners  so  that  profits  are  largely  repatriated  to  outside  investors.  The  few 
workers employed in these operations can hardly generate enough demand for the 
growth of regional markets. The specialized knowledge and technology required by 
modern mining are not widely applicable to other economic activities (Clark and 
North, 2006: 3). Given the pressures of international competition (Schnaiberg and 
Gould, 1994), the rate of extraction is of crucial importance: the faster, the better. 
This makes the prospect of sustainable socio-economic development for mining 
communities  highly  elusive.  Because  mining  ventures  are  high-risk,  companies 
often  externalize  many  of  these  risks  onto  local  –  and  relatively  powerless  – 
Living space 
 
 
Supply      
depot 
  
 
Waste 
repository 
     Living  
    space 
 
  
Supply  
  depot   
   
Waste    
repository 8  Gold and Displacement    85 
populations.  Or,  in  more  positive  terms,  they  limit  their  social  responsibility 
towards communities as much as possible (Szablowski, 2002: 254). This makes the 
latter vulnerable to the vagaries of processes and decisions entirely beyond their 
control:  fluctuations  in  mineral  prices,  corporate  mergers  and  acquisitions,  cost 
overruns, technological risks and political struggles.  
The second macro-social process is the Romanian post-socialist  transition. 
During the socialist period, Roşia Montană was an important gold producer for the 
state,  as  the  owner  of  the  entire  Romanian  economy.  Given  the  strategic 
importance of gold production, the Roşia Montanǎ mining area enjoyed a relatively 
privileged status (Sîntimbrean et al., 2006: 42). Even before 1948, Roşia Montanǎ 
had  displayed  a  semi-urban  character  (Pop,  2002),  with  a  population  engaged 
primarily  in  resource  extraction  rather  than  agriculture.  This  trend  was 
strengthened during socialism with the large-scale, industrial production of gold
11. 
A large proportion of the local population was therefore dependent on wages and 
various amenities and benefits from the state mining company.  
With the collapse of the socialist regime in 1989, mining at Roşia Montană 
was progressively downsized and eventually closed in 2006. This was part of the 
restructuring of the mining sector in Romania, following the structural adjustment 
policies of the World Bank (Larionescu et al., 1999). The withdrawal of the state 
from the local economy has been a heavy blow for the local population, resulting in 
depopulation  and  high  unemployment.  This  came  in  stark  contrast t o  t h e  
expectations for growth and development in the early years of the transition.   
Post – 1989 governments were interested in attracting foreign investors with 
new technology to exploit Romania’s low grade gold deposits. Gold could be used 
to stabilize Romania’s volatile economy and offer a constant source of foreign 
exchange  and  employment  opportunities  for  impoverished  mining-dependent 
communities.  Interestingly,  investments  in  modern  mines  were  regarded  as 
opportunities  for  cleaning  up  the  notorious  pollution  of  inefficient  socialist 
enterprises (Argeşeanu Cunningham 2005: 102).   
The latter proved to be a problematic proposition. In 2000, the same year that 
Romania commenced negotiations to join the European Union (EU), a joint venture 
between  the  Romanian  state  and  an  Australian  mining  company  produced  the 
‘worst disaster since Chernobyl’ (Argeşeanu Cunningham 2005: 99). A failure of 
the tailings dam at the Aurul gold mine in north-east Romania released 10,000 
cubic  meters  of  waste  water  containing  sodium  cyanide  and  heavy  metals  into 
waterways in Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia, affecting 2,000 kilometers of the 
Danube catchment area (Argeşeanu Cunningham 2005: 99). This accident revealed 
the propensity of risky investments to seek lax environmental regimes not only in 
the  ‘Third  World’  but  also  in  the  transition  economies  of  Eastern  Europe 
(Schwabach, 2000: 10 515).  
                                                 
11 Still, the annual production of 0.580 million tones was substantially smaller compared to the 
annual production for the proposed RMGC project (13 million tones) (Sîntimbrean et al., 2006: 39; 
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Romania’s EU accession in 2007 was a mixed blessing from the point of 
view  of  environmental  protection.  On  the  one  hand,  the  pre-accession  strategy 
emphasized  the  restoration  and  protection  of  the  environment.  The  European 
Commission noted in 2001 certain improvements in the adoption of environmental 
legislation (Costi, 2003: 293). On the other hand, however, the extent to which 
national  governments  are  willing  to  comply  with  EU  requirements  is  likely  to 
diminish after accession (Ban and Romanţan, forthcoming: 5). There might be, in 
fact,  a  collusion  of  interests  between  newer  and  older  members  of  the  EU: 
‘Privately, some EU officials also worry that member states will offer the applicant 
countries a quid pro quo by ‘letting them off’ on strict and timely fulfillment of the 
environmental acquis to compensate for being especially tough with them on such 
politically charged issues as the free movement of labour and refugees’ (Kramer, 
2004: 291).   
Rather than a monolithic entity, the EU should be conceptualized, following 
Ban and Romanţan (forthcoming: 4) as a ‘plurality of contentious actors’. Their 
conflicting  interests  are  recognizable  in  the  struggle  over  Roşia  Montană.  The 
European Parliament was quite vocal in the opposition against the mining project 
and the NGOs opposing the RMGC project capitalized on this opportunity (Ban 
and Romanţan, forthcoming: 9). However, the European Commission adopted a 
hands-off stance on this issue and in 2006, it effectively removed any pressures on 
Romania to deal with Roşia Montană, formerly a ‘hotspot’ in its environmental 
dossier (Ban and Romanţan, forthcoming: 10–11).  
During the last few years, Romania has experienced a significant growth in 
its real estate market. The price of land increased constantly and so did the cost of 
living. As a result, RMGC was compelled, among other factors, to offer increased 
levels of compensation in its 2006 RRAP compared to its 2003 RRAP.  
The  third  process  which  shapes  the  macro-social  environment  of  Roşia 
Montanǎ  is  the  growing  power  of  international  NGOs.  These  militate  against 
corporate misconduct and speak against the exploitation of the lands of powerless 
communities  (e.g.  Greenpeace,  Mining  Watch,  Bank  Watch  etc.).  The  ensuing 
conflict between RMGC and the opposing NGO resulted in the temporary success 
of the latter. This outcome can be explained by several factors. First, rather than 
focusing  only  on  environmental  issues,  the  project  opposition  has  successfully 
advanced an array of socio-economic, environmental and archaeological/cultural 
arguments against the proposed mine. Second, the NGO coalition has effectively 
mobilized  expertise  from  different  fields  (geochemistry,  conservation  and 
biodiversity,  law,  social  sciences,  archaeology  etc.)  to  articulate  a  persuasive 
campaign  against  the  mine.  Third,  and  most  importantly,  NGOs  secured  their 
access to the ‘monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of EU governance’. (Ban 
and Romanţan, forthcoming: 14).  
This  success  came  at  a  price.  Unlike  the  conventional  assumption  that 
advocacy groups represent and foster local interests (De Echave, 2005: 120; Kalb, 10  Gold and Displacement    87 
2006: 107), the argument advanced here reveals a deep fracture between extralocal 
activists and the residents of Roşia Montană. They both appear to struggle with the 
uncertainties  created  by  the  proposed  project,  but  there  are  different  types  of 
uncertainty  that  concern  each  group.  The  NGO  coalition  focuses  on  the 
technological and environmental risks of the project. For them, only the definitive 
cancellation  of  the  project  can  bring  the  situation  back  to  ‘nor m a l ’ .  F o r  t h e  
displacees  and  the  local  population,  the  uncertainties  span  a  much  wider  field 
which is far from coherent. Fears of impoverishment and marginalization – and 
thus the acceptance of compensation and relocation – coexist with concerns about 
the possible health and environmental effects of the new project. The extralocal 
opponents fail to recognize that RMGC and its proposed project have become part 
of the local social fabric even if, at the same time, the latter are one of the forces 
that  tear  this  fabric  apart.  This  issue  will  be  explored  in  the  section  on 
‘Marginalization in  
METHODS AND DATA USED 
The  analysis  is  based  on  ninety  semi-structured  interviews,  which  were 
carried  out  in  three  stages:  a  pre-test  of  the  interview  schedule  in  May  2007 
involving eight interviews, followed by sixty-seven interviews in July 2007 and 
fifteen interviews in May 2008. In addition, two prominent leaders of Alburnus 
Maior were also interviewed. All interviews were carried out in Romanian by the 
author, with the exception of the interviews in July 2007 which were gathered with 
the help of three research assistants. The field research in Roşia Montană and the 
surrounding area also included participant observation of public meetings and the 
collection of documentary material (the RRAP and socio-economic surveys).  
The respondents were chosen to maximize the diversity of points of view. 
They were recruited from the project-affected area (parts of Roşia Montană and 
Abrud),  from  the  area  in  close  proximity  to  the  affected  area  (rest  of  Roşia 
Montană and Abrud, as well as Bucium and Câmpeni) and from the county capital 
Alba  Iulia.  Individuals  at  different  stages  in  the  resettlement  process  were 
interviewed: 14 per cent of them have already relocated to Abrud, Câmpeni or Alba 
Iulia; 16 per cent are resettlers who still live in Roşia Montană until RMGC builds 
the resettlement sites; 27 per cent have not sold their properties to RMGC but were 
willing to sell them at the time of the interview; 8 per cent refuse to sell their 
properties while another 27 per cent of the sample live outside the affected area and 
are not eligible for compensation. 8 per cent have an ‘uncertain’ status.  
The gender distribution is slightly biased in favour of men (52 per cent). The 
age structure is dominated by older adults and the elderly (totalling 73 per cent). 
Those less than forty years of age represent only 27 per cent of the respondents. In 
terms of employment, 43 per cent of the respondents are pensioners, 13 per cent are 
unemployed,  10  per  cent  are  homemakers  and  4  per  cent  are  students.  The   Filip Alexandrescu  11  88 
proportion of economically inactive persons (70 per cent of all respondents) is very 
high. Both the age and employment structures reflect the peripheral status of Roşia 
Montană,  as  it  experiences  high  unemployment,  out  migration  of  its  younger 
cohorts and an aging population (Waack, 2004a).  
This paper uses the IRR model as an analytical framework to explore the 
vulnerability to which the population from Roşia Montană is exposed. For different 
the dimensions of impoverishment from the IRR model, to which I have added two 
subsections on ‘successful relocatees’ and the issue of compensation, I provide 
quantitative evidence
12 regarding their possible impacts on the displacees and the 
local  population.  Based  on  the  author’s  empirical  research,  each  of  these 
dimensions is then enriched by contextualizing the objective evidence within the 
microcosm of respondents’ subjective experience of vulnerability. The evidence for 
the macro context is drawn from secondary analyses of the mining literature, the 
literature dealing with the East European transition and from interviews with and 
observations of extralocal activists in Roşia Montană.   
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
THE MICRO-SOCIAL CONTEXT: STRUGGLING WITH UNCERTAINTY  
AT ROŞIA MONTANĂ 
This introductory section is meant to capture, in broad strokes, the feelings of 
restlessness and uncertainty that crop up repeatedly in the interviews that I carried 
out  in  the  Roşia  Montană  area.  The  following  subsections  will  show  how 
uncertainty is experienced within each of the categories of the IRR model.  
Being  part  of  the  socialist  block,  Roşia  Montană  has  until  recently  been 
shielded from transnational socio-economic forces. However, with the fall of state 
socialism  in  1989,  powerful  global  investors  and  militant  civil  society 
organizations  have  clashed  over  the  landscape  of  this  old  mining  community, 
thereby exposing the local population to new risks – uncertainty and apprehension 
about its future – both individually and collectively (see Figure 2). 
The pervasive sense of restlessness, illustrated in this collection of excerpts 
from interviews, is perhaps the most common theme encountered in conversations 
with  displacees  and  local  people.  Accepted  with  resignation  or  restlessness, 
uncertainty is experienced by various respondents, regardless of age or gender, 
whether they are in favour of the project or not, both inside and outside the affected 
area. Those who have sold their properties are unsure where life will take them. 
RMGC employees do not know if the company will offer the desired workplaces in 
mining. Moreover, risks loom both ways, for those who leave as for those who 
stay. What was previously taken for granted becomes illusory or incomprehensible.  
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Uncertainty appears to be endemic because the national frame of reference in 
which Roşia Montană was as an important mining town in a socialist economy has 
given way to the competing frames of global investors who have found a new 
Eastern  European  ‘El  Dorado’  and  influential  NGOs  fighting  to  preserve  a 
community  from  destruction.  After  the  suspension  of  the  permitting  process,  a 
member of the local elite commented: ‘Some things have happened which neither 
we,  nor  the  [company],  nor  anybody,  could  have  imagined’ .  ( N .  R . ,  R M
13, 
emphasis  added).  The  fate  of  the  local  community  appears  as  the  uncertain 
outcome of influences over which no local actor seems to have control. Echoing 
Casey (2006: 2), ‘it's not the geology but the politics of trying to build a mine in 
the  face  of  environmental  opposition’  that  has  kept  RMGC  from  commencing 
operations at the same time as it has put local life on hold.    
 
RESETTLEMENT AS OPPORTUNITY 
 
The experiences of the relocatees from Roşia Montană who have ended up 
better  off  provide  a  useful  contra s t  w i t h  t h e  l e s s  f o r t u n a t e  r e sidents  of  Roşia 
Montană.  Who  are  the  ‘successful  relocatees’?  First,  they  report  a  feeling  of 
comfort or satisfaction at the new location and do not show signs of experiencing 
uncertainty/unhappiness in their lives. Second, an objective researcher can easily 
notice that their life is materially comfortable and that the compensation for the 
property has been at least adequate.  
Eight respondents included in this research meet these criteria. In describing 
her life at the new location, R. O. states: ‘Life is very good in Câmpeni – we are 
very satisfied with the house we purchased. We lived well in Roşia Montană but 
here we live even better’. Another respondent explained: ‘Things have been much 
better  since  I  moved  to  Abrud  [in  2002].  Life  is  easier  […]  and  better  living 
conditions. To move from [an apartment of] 37 m
2 to a [house of] 210 m
2 and still 
have some money left is no mean feat’ (V. H., Abrud). L.S. from Abrud also lauds 
the ‘improved living conditions in Abrud; [we] have water, more stores when you 
go shopping’. His mother adds: ‘We got quickly used [to life here]. We moved, we 
now live in the city’.  
What do these relocatees have in common? First, they have all left Roşia 
Montanǎ  and  with  it,  the  uncertainties  which  beset  this  area  earmarked  for 
‘development’ but where development cannot yet take place. Being among the first 
to move out of Roşia Montană, L. E. recalls how they were told by their neighbors 
that they will be cheated out of an adequate compensation for their house. Other 
early relocatees, H. R. and his wife recount how they stayed for two weeks with 
‘half a house purchased in Alba Iulia and another half still [not sold] in Roşia 
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Montană’. R.O. admits that they took a risk when they moved to Câmpeni but this 
risk ‘worked in their favor’. For all three, the uncertainty has been short term: once 
they moved, they used the compensation money to start a better life.   
Second,  they  have  managed  to  put  an  end  to  their  socio-economic 
marginalization  by  obtaining  large  compensation  packages  from  the  company. 
They have used the compensation money to purchase a good quality property in an 
urban area. However, they have used only part of the compensation money for this 
acquisition while the rest has been used for other purposes. For example, L. E. and 
his wife (Alba Iulia) have used only one third of the compensation for buying a 
new house in a large city. They have used the surplus to help their two children – 
one to buy an apartment and the other an automobile. Third, these respondents 
have a stable income source (in most cases a pension) that is independent of the 
uncertain employment in Roşia Montanǎ
14.  
The resettlement experience of these respondents has been, both subjectively 
and objectively, very positive. This finding is important in two respects. First, it 
begins  to  shed  light  on  the  fact  that  resettlement  at  Roşia  Montană  has  highly 
differential  effects  on  diverse  individuals  and  groups.  Second,  it  illustrates  the 
specific nature of resettlement risks at Roşia Montană where extralocal influences 
shape  local  decisions.  The  issues  are  not  simply  inadequate  compensation  but 
rather  being  able  to  obtain  compensation  before  contingent  events  put  on  hold 
one’s  decision  to  relocate;  not  simply  homelessness  but  rather  vulnerability  to 
unexpected standstills in the resettlement process; not food insecurity but rather 
socio-economic marginalization for individuals who used to think of themselves as 
urbanites. 
 
COMPENSATION: MOVING OUT AND MOVING UP 
 
Although  recent  scholarship  has  shown  that  compensation  alone  is  not 
sufficient to prevent the socio-economic vulnerability of displacees (Cernea, 2008), 
the compensation paid for properties by RMGC has been adequate, if not generous. 
In a World Bank review of thirty-one projects involving resettlement, the authors 
calculated the ratio between the resettlement cost per capita and the GNI
15 per 
capita for each project (World Bank, 1996). The study concluded that: ‘None of the 
projects with a ratio of 3.5 or higher had reported major resettlement difficulties’. 
Table 1 shows the level of compensation in different years, as well as the ratio of 
resource allocation to GNI, for the RMGC project. The latter compares favourably 
with the ratios from the World Bank study.  
                                                 
14 However, there are also exceptions. One respondent (L.S., Abrud) has worked for RMGC 
and now works with another company in the mining industry.  
15 http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/glossary/showTerm.asp#99.  GNP  has  been  renamed 
gross national income (GNI) in the System of National Accounts. 14  Gold and Displacement    91 
More  exactly,  in  fifteen  of  the  projects  reviewed  (e.g.  hydropower  or 
irrigation in Lesotho, India, Nigeria, Argentina and Brazil or transportation projects 
in China or Malawi) the ratio of resource allocation was less than 3.5 (World Bank, 
1996: 145–6). In some extreme cases, populations in Africa were evicted without 
any  compensation  to  make  way  for  national  parks,  as  in  the  case  of  Uganda’s 
Kibale Game Corridor (Cernea and Schmidt-Soltau 2006: 1811). In contrast, even 
at its lowest (in 2004), the ratio for RMGC is almost double the 3.5 cut-off.  
 
Figure 2 
The faces of uncertainty – voices from Roşia Montană 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is probably the curse of gold 
[…] Isn’t it the curse of gold? 
That [the company] comes and 
you  have  to  leave[.]  They 
don’t  force  you,  you  leave 
because  you  want  to.  (L.  B., 
Roşia Montană, affected area) 
[Risks] for those who stay: what awaits them here? 
What will their children [or] grandchildren do? What 
will be in the future? For those who leave: they are 
not accepted by the society where they go; they are 
not well regarded because they will increase the land 
prices[;] they can pay a lot of money [they do not 
negotiate, they pay with cash on the spot]; they are 
marginalized.  Risks  [are]  both  ways...” 
(N. T., Roşia Montană, outside the affected area). 
You take the risk; we sold [our 
property] two weeks ago; this is 
also  a  risk;  you  don’t  know 
where  life  takes  you.  (N.  R., 
Roşia Montană, affected area) 
[If  the  project  will  take 
place]:  I  am  sure  that 
workplaces will only be for 
500 [people] and they will 
be  unable  to  hire  from 
Bucium  and  Corna.  They 
will [bring] their people. It 
will be a desert. A Sahara! 
A  ruined  landscape, 
[without]  workplaces. 
Some  have  put  all  their 
hope  in  [the  company]  – 
that  it  will  bring  them 
happiness. The area will be 
depopulated in a maximum 
o f  f i f t e e n  y e a r s .  ( R .  R . ,  
Bucium,  outside  affected 
area).  
If there will be workplaces 
as they [company] claim… 
we cannot tell, maybe next 
year.  We  have  been 
waiting  for  ten  years.  (N. 
N.,  Roşia  Montană, 
affected area). 
Life  was  safer  before  [during 
socialism]  – things  change  too 
much these days – companies go 
bankrupt etc. Now you are like a 
shipwrecked  sailor,  beaten  by 
waves  from  all  directions.  (H. 
S.,  Roşia  Montană,  affected 
area) 
One  year  passes  after  the 
other and [the company] is 
still  here  and  nothing 
happens  and  you  are 
always  stressed.  (R.  N, 
Roşia  Montană,  affected 
area) 
The [company] worries me 
because  they  want  me  to 
leave and they also want to 
leave –  and  I don’t  know 
what  to  believe.  (R.  T., 
Roşia  Montană,  affected 
area) 
I am afraid that if I [choose] a 
house at Piatra Albă, [what if] 
they  don’t  keep  my  children 
on  the  job?  I  don’t  know 
what’s on their mind. (L. N., 
Roşia Montană, affected area) 
 
You  see  one  neighbor 
leaving,  then  another… 
and you ask yourself: what 
is going to happen? (H. T., 
Roşia  Montană,  affected 
area) 
[I agree with the project and I 
trust  that  the  company  will 
do  a  good  job].  But  it 
r e m a i n s  t o  b e  s e e n  w h e n  i t  
starts  if  they  respect  the 
environmental  regulations. 
(H.  C.,  Roşia  Montană, 
affected area)   Filip Alexandrescu  15  92 
There is still an obvious discrepancy between the compensation levels paid 
between  2002  and  2004  and  those  paid  in  2006.  The  latter  year,  when 
compensation  was  paid  at  three  times  the  level  between  2002  and  2004,  was 
considered decisive for the project because RMGC submitted its EIA report and 
hoped  to  finish  the  acquisition  process  as  quickly  as  possible. T h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  
compensation  also  reflects  the  growing  real  estate  prices  and  the  stronger 
bargaining power of the relocatees. Even if the objective risk of decapitalization is 
low, it is worthwhile to ask about the interpretation of this compensation by the 
affected persons.    
 
Table 1 
Relocatees and Compensation Amounts in the RMGC Project (2002–2006) 
Year  Number of families 
accepting compensation 
Compensation 
per family (US $) 
Compensation per 
‘rightful owner’ (US $)
Ratio of resource 
allocation to GNI 
2002    49    41,143  20,744  10.75 
2003  213    65,737  22,823    9.97 
2004    33    52,242  20,068    6.80 
2006  145  161,379  70,582  14.61 
Source: 1918 Univ. 2007: 78–79; World Bank website 
 
Of the sixty-seven interviewees in the Roşia Montană area who had not been 
relocated by July 2007, 30 per cent consider that their properties are worth at least 
$245,000
16. Those willing to relocate from Roşia Montană expect not only a house 
but also the financial means to secure their long-term livelihood or an improved 
socio-economic status for themselves or their children: ‘I was offered $60,000 but I 
want a house and an additional $80,000 in a bank account. […] My pension is not 
enough for living somewhere else […] I also want to offer my son a home’ (E. O., RM).  
In fact, several respondents explained that they would be unable to cover the 
additional expenses that they would incur if they were to live somewhere else than 
Roşia Montană: ‘If I go there [city in Western Romania], I have to pay for water, 
garbage, everything’ (N.S., RM). Eleven interviewees expressed concerns that the 
compensations received would be insufficient to cover these long-term livelihood 
needs. 
There are, however, a variety of reasons for which displacees seem to expect 
these high levels of compensation. A few respondents disapprove of the intrusion 
of the mining company into their lives and demand compensation for the ‘moral 
damage’  or  ‘psychological  war’  (N.  U.,  RM)  inflicted  upon  them. A n o t h e r  
respondent living close to the project footprint demands compensation so that they 
can ‘move out [of Roşia Montană] and not be polluted’ (R. I.). Some self-declared 
opponents of the project are relatively wealthy and they reject the compensation 
offers as insufficient. In general, the most common view regarding the ‘appropriate’ 
level of compensation is related to improvements in one’s socio-economic status.  
                                                 
16 Not all of these respondents are eligible for compensation but they either live within the 
project footprint or in close proximity (all are inhabitants of the Roşia Montană commune).  16  Gold and Displacement    93 
More precisely, the level of compensation is construed by displaced residents 
as  not  simply  a  replacement  of  property  but  rather  as  an  investment i n  t h e i r  
individual socio-economic reestablishment and advancement. However, unlike the 
novel policy-approach – argued and recommended by Cernea (2008: 58) – RMGC 
does not explicitly define ‘investment in the improvement of resettlers’ livelihoods’ 
as a policy objective of its RRAP. What can be seen in the 2006 levels of payments 
as perhaps the inclusion of ‘investment supplements over compensation proper’ has 
emerged rather spontaneously. No mechanism of benefit-sharing is used by RMGC 
to help develop the Roşia Montană community, but only one-time compensations. 
This reinforces the trend towards the individualization of resettlement, which can 
partly explain the differences in outcomes among different displacees. 
In addition, the desire for rapid upward mobility is a typical phenomenon for 
the post-socialist transition, in which individuals hope to reverse the downward 
socio-economic trend experienced after the fall of communism (Genov, 2000). If 
they are too old to climb higher on the social ladder, their children should enjoy an 
elevated social status: ‘[RMGC] should give me enough so that my children can 
wear ties their whole lives!’ (N. E., RM). Another respondent comments on how 
some of those who have sold their houses have a ‘higher social position’ (T. R., 
RM). H. T. (RM) explains that those who sold their properties have purchased new 
cars (i.e. status-lending consumer goods): ‘ “Dacia”
17 has no value here anymore; 
there are Jeeps, Audis, [Volkswagen] Golfs’ (R.D., RM).    
Moreover, social mobility very often means geographic mobility. Of the 295 
households relocated between 2002 and 2006, 39 per cent have chosen to move to 
another  county  in  Romania  or  abroad  (1918  Univ.,  2007:  80).  In  addition,  an 
undetermined number of residents wish to be resettled in Alba Iulia. Only a small 
number of displacees
18 are willing to resettle to ‘Piatra Albă’ (i.e. are willing to 
stay in the Roşia Montană area). As one respondent explained, ‘Alba Iulia is for 
those who want to [advance], while Piatra Albă is for those who want to stay as 
they are’ (M. R., RM). The centrifugal movement of Roşia Montană relocatees can 
be interpreted as an effort to escape from vulnerability and impoverishment. For a 
largely non-agricultural population, this means moving to the city, which offers 
both better employment opportunities and the possibility to partake in an urban 
lifestyle.  
LANDLESSNESS 
The loss of land at Roşia Montană will be massive. The company intends to 
replace the 1660 ha earmarked for the mining project with as little as 120 ha (7 per 
cent) (RMGC, 2006c: 64). If this project would have taken place in an agricultural 
                                                 
17 Romanian socialist-era automobile.  
18 Approximately  30  families  (http://www.green-report.ro/stiri/nou-cartier-pentru-locuitori-
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region of Africa (such as the Kwale titanium mine in Kenya, see Abuodha, 2002: 
203)  or  Asia  (e.g.  in  the  Nimad  plain,  the  ‘bread  bowl’  of  central  India,  see 
Dwivedi  1999:  48),  the  consequences  would  have  been  abysmal.  At R o ş i a  
Montană,  however,  the  loss  of  land  has  highly  differentiated  impacts.  For  the 
majority of displacees who want to move to urban areas, the loss of agricultural 
land seems to be of only marginal importance. This appears to be the case even if a 
survey of 247 households in the Roşia Montană area found that 77 per cent keep 
farm animals and 89 per cent engage in agriculture to a greater or lesser extent 
(Planning Alliance, 2002).  
First, only a minority of residents want to move to a rural area such as Piatra 
Albă. Second, of 82 interviewees, less than half claimed that they would like to see 
a development of agriculture in the future of Roşia Montană. The remainder were 
either hostile to this idea (47 per cent) or uncertain (12 per cent).This underscores 
the desire for upward mobility from a subsistence-dependent to an urban lifestyle. 
‘I had enough of agriculture’ says N. S. of Roşia Montană. T. R. (RM) explains 
that, even if he were to keep cows, ‘there is nowhere you can sell your milk given 
the European standards. To have a farm you need a lot of land, to work it with 
equipment, to be efficient.’ This is symptomatic for the peripherialization of this 
area as a whole. Subsistence agriculture becomes impossible under the agricultural 
policies of the EU which favour large, market-oriented farms (Waack, 2004b: 94–5)
19. 
Under  the  twin  pressures  of  large-scale  mining  and  large-scale  agriculture,  the 
former miners and part-time farmers see little escape than to move out of the area. 
For the poorest in Roşia Montană, who rely on subsistence agriculture and 
access to common resources (e.g. forests), impoverishment will probably be similar 
to that of subsistence farmers displaced by large-scale mines in Ghana (Hilson et 
al.,  2007:  419).  However,  for  the  former,  alternative  employment  in  artisanal 
mining is not possible due to low-grade ores in Romania.  Landlessness is also a 
risk  for  those  residents  who  are  primarily  farmers  (about  37  households  –  see 
RMGC, 2003: 51). Such residents seem to refuse to sell their properties to RMGC 
but  their  fate  could  worsen  significantly  if  the  company  decides  to  expropriate 
them. These residents are highly vulnerable to the vagaries of the approval process 
for the mine and they could lose their livelihood source through landlessness or 
negative environmental impacts, if the project is eventually approved.  
HOMELESSNESS: ‘WE ARE NOW TENANTS OF THE COMPANY!’ 
The  risk  of  homelessness  assumes  a  peculiar  form  at  Roşia  Montană. 
Although  RMGC  has  purchased  three  quarters  of  the  affected  properties, 
approximately 200 households have sold their houses in Roşia Montană but will 
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still live in them until RMGC builds the resettlement sites at Dealul Furcilor and 
Piatra Albă. As of May 2008, the company had built only 2 per cent of the houses 
at Dealul Furcilor and none at Piatra Albă. Although the company has assured 
residents that house construction will be continued even if the approval process for 
the project is suspended, the future of the two resettlement sites is highly uncertain. 
Given the cost-reducing imperative of mining ventures, RMGC has little incentive 
to invest in the resettlement project as long as there is no hope to commence the 
mining operations. The residents who have opted for Piatra Albă or Dealul Furcilor 
have currently only the compensation money. They have no property rights over 
their ‘former’ properties, but only use-rights. As one participant in a public meeting 
said (December 2007), they are ‘tenants of the company’, uncertain of their future. 
At the same time, homelessness is a major risk for those residents who rent their 
dwelling, as the RRAP prescribes no compensation for them (2006a: 45).    
THE FEARS OF JOBLESSNESS 
The history of labour at Roşia Montană has gone through several stages over 
the last sixty years. Before mid-century, residents could find work in private mines 
or  in  the  state  mine.  Following  the  nationalization  of  the  means  of  production 
(1948), mining ceased and the inhabitants migrated to other mining areas to find 
employment. The socialist state reopened the mines in the 1950s (Sîntimbrean et 
al., 2006) and inhabitants were hired at the state mine. After 1989, operations at the 
state  mine  (RoşiaMin)  were  gradually  reduced  and  eventually  ceased  in  2006. 
Unemployment emerged as a ‘new’ challenge in post-socialist Romania and it is no 
surprise that 46 per cent of eight-two respondents stated that the problem at Roşia 
Montană is the lack of workplaces. As one respondent explained full of surprise: 
‘Our fathers and forefathers said that mining is good. I don’t understand why they 
stopped it’ (R. T., RM).  
Over the period between 1997 and 2007, 673 employees from Roşia Montană 
and 746 from Abrud were laid off from the mining sector (1918 Univ., 2007: 51). 
In 2007, RMGC employed
20 286 inhabitants from Roşia Montană and 73 from 
Abrud (1918 Univ., 2007: 87) for various exploratory and preparatory activities. 
However, the new jobs represented only 25 per cent of the number of workers 
dismissed. The void in employment created by the closure of RoşiaMin was only 
partly  compensated  by  RMGC.  Caught  between  the  retrenchment  of  the  state 
mining  sector  and  a  privately  funded  development  project,  the  population 
experienced a net loss of jobs during the past decade. This only mirrors, albeit on a 
smaller  scale,  the  effects  that  structural  adjustment  programs  (SAPs)  had  on 
employment  in  sub-Saharan  Africa:  many  of  those  left  unemployed  due  to  the 
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privatization of the mining industry were not absorbed in the large-scale mining 
sector (Banchirigah, 2006: 167; Hilson and Potter, 2005).  
Moreover,  ‘when  times  are  tough  in  the  mineral  industry  […]  typical 
responses by mining companies are to cut costs and/ or increase production’ (Hall 
and Vries, 2003: 191). Although RMGC has not yet reached its operational stage, it 
would be hard to doubt that ‘times are tough’ for the project developers given that 
the approval process for the new mine has been suspended. In response, RMGC 
has laid off two thirds of its workforce in Roşia Montană in early 2008. One former 
RMGC employee complains: ‘they threw me off like a dog’ (M. I., RM).  
In fact, in recent years there has been growing discontent worldwide among 
local communities which see themselves burdened with the negative impacts of 
mining and receive few of the benefits, especially because large mines are capital-
intensive and not labour-intensive (Pegg, 2006: 380) and they generate ‘only a 
fraction of the jobs that they did a generation or two ago’ (McMahon and Remy, 
2001: 2). The case of Coal India Ltd illustrates the huge challenges of offering 
sufficient workplaces to ever growing numbers of displacees (Mathur 2008: 266). 
What  appears  as  a  cost-reducing  imperative  for  the  company  is  very 
problematic for the local population. The jobs created by RMGC have not only an 
economic  function  but  also  serve  as  legitimation  for  the  project.  Although  not 
formally stated in the RRAP (RMGC, 2006a), the company committed itself to 
hiring at least one member from each family to be resettled or relocated. All those 
hired  under  the  apparently  benevolent  hand  of  the  company  are  nevertheless 
exposed to the vagaries of changing business needs: ‘They say they hire one from 
[each] family. They don’t say for how many months they hire you, it is uncertain 
for how many years, how many months they keep you on the job. They hire you 
today, [but] tomorrow or the day after someone does not like you anymore. I have 
enough stress already.’ (L. B., RM). Another respondent claims that, paradoxically, 
‘mining pushes people out of Roşia Montană, […]. They [company] will hire only 
a few’ (S. E., RM).  
The new mine is supposed to create 1200 jobs during the construction period 
(two years), and 640 jobs during the mining period (sixteen years). The hiring policy 
specifies that residents of Roşia Montană will be preferred
21 but that ‘all recruitment 
remains subject to the Company’s operational requirements’. Employment is thus 
strictly controlled by the project developers and exposes all those who do not meet 
business requirements to the risk of joblessness. It is therefore not surprising that of 
thirty respondents of working age interviewed, only three mentioned that they could 
personally benefit from the new jobs created by the future mine.  
The  uncertainty  of  workplaces  manifests  itself  in  apparently  paradoxical 
beliefs. Almost 78 per cent of 90 respondents claimed, that the state-owned mine 
from Roşia Montană should have continued its operation. Rather than socialist-era 
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nostalgia,  these  views  could  be  more  appropriately  interpreted  as  an  acute 
awareness of the instability of the promised workplaces. At the state mine, ‘there 
were more workplaces, safer, and [even] our descendents could have [found] work’ 
(N. T., RM). Even an RMGC employee explained that the company does not offer 
enough  workplaces  so  that  the  state-owned  company  should  have  hired  the 
remaining workforce (R. R., RM).   
The uncertainties related to mining jobs at Roşia Montană, if the project is 
approved,  are  readily  understandable  in  the  context  of  similar  cases  both  in 
developed and in developing countries. For example, Slack and Jensen (2004: 136, 
143) describe in detail the ‘ “rollercoaster” trajectory of mining employment’ in the 
US, while Freudenburg and Wilson (2002: 572) point out the periodic shutdowns 
of mining operations when mineral prices are low. The situation is no different for 
gold mines in the ‘Third World’, for example in Ghana (Hilson and Yakovleva, 
2007: 104) 
The  RMGC  project  makes  the  population  vulnerable  also  because  it  will 
displace all other economic activities from the project footprint. According to a 
Socio-Economic Survey (2002) carried out for RMGC, agricultural activities have 
played a certain role among the livelihood sources of the population (Planning 
Alliance, 2002). More importantly, the proposed project involves the suppression 
of a livelihood source for precisely those inhabitants that are least likely to benefit 
from mine-related jobs (the elderly and women).  
In conclusion, joblessness emerges from a combination of two macro-social 
processes: the withdrawal of the former socialist state from the exploitation of a 
‘strategic resource’ (gold) and the penetration of foreign direct investment aiming 
at short-term exploitation. Employment opportunities at Roşia Montană are either 
highly uncertain, as in the mining industry, or unfeasible, due to social mobility, 
depopulation  and  a  strict  agricultural  policy,  as  in  the  case  of  subsistence 
agriculture.  The  new  project  could  destroy  tourist  attractions  and  even  in  the 
absence of the project, the development of a tourist infrastructure would require 
high investments.   
SOCIAL DISARTICULATION 
Downing  wrote  that  in  involuntary  resettlement,  ‘people  may  physically 
persist but the community that was is no more’ (1996: 34). This captures well what 
has happened at Roşia Montană. Social disarticulation afflicts mostly those who are 
still in Roşia Montană, continuing to live in a ‘community’ that is physically there, 
but has been ‘emptied’ socially and culturally
22.  
About  27  per  cent  of  seventy-five  respondents  decried  the  ‘disunity’  and 
‘hate’ that have emerged after the company came to Roşia Montană
23. ‘They got to 
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the point where they are ready to hurt each other. The one who  works for the 
[company] is the enemy of the one who wants to stay; the latter is guilty that the 
former has no workplace’ says R. M. from Roşia Montană. New forms of social 
differentiation have also emerged: ‘The lowliest cleaner [hired] by the company 
doesn’t say “good day” anymore…’ (N. E., RM). The socio-economic cleavages 
that  have  accompanied  the  post-socialist  transition  have  exacerbated  the  social 
disruption produced by the RMGC project.   
There has been an intense debate in Romania and internationally over the 
risks  of  cyanide-in-leach  technology.  Concern  over  the  health  dangers  of  this 
technology and the technological impact of the project in general is quite pregnant 
in some respondents: ‘If [cyanide] affects the environment in such a way, how 
much [more] can it affect us?’; ‘We can [even] die’ (L. S. and R. S. RM, outside 
the affected area). Another respondent, also living close to the affected area, says: 
‘For us, it is a catastrophe! The tailings pond. We have to swallow all the cyanide 
and all the emissions’ (R.R., close to affected area). However, other respondents 
held opposite views. When asked what cyanide means to her, C. E. (RM, affected 
area) answered: ‘I know what it is. I worked with it […]. It is a chemical, this is 
what it means. That’s all. I know it is dangerous, but it can be found in some fruits 
and vegetables, obviously in small quantities’.   
There  is  an  obvious  cleavage  between  the  displacees  who  will  be 
compensated for their properties and can move elsewhere, and the local population 
living in close proximity to the project. Among the latter respondents (28 in total), 
more than three quarters, see the use of cyanide in a negative way: ‘the problem is 
that the company should be mindful of those who stay in the area, close to the 
[mine]. Nobody cares about those who stay; we have no warranty; this is a risk’  
(N.  R.,  RM,  outside  affected  area).  These  examples  show  that,  in  addition  to 
differences of status and wealth, technological threats further tear the social fabric 
apart (Short 1984).   
MARGINALIZATION IN DECISIONS CONCERNING THE PROJECT 
Marginalization  refers  to  the  exclusion  of  the  local  population  from  the 
agendas and decisions of extralocal actors, even when these decisions affect local 
lives and livelihoods. At Roşia Montană, residents are marginalized by RMGC and 
the NGOs that support the project as well as by the NGOs which oppose it
24. An 
implicit statement in the RRAP (RMGC, 2003) is that the project is a ‘given’. In 
focus  group  discussions  RMGC  asked  respondents  ‘to  discuss  and  agree  on 
livelihood and/or coping strategies of the affected communities’ (RRAP, 2003: 30). 
However, there is no acknowledgment that the local population could participate in 
fundamental  decisions  about  the  project,  beyond  adapting  and  ‘coping’  with 
                                                 
24 These  are:  Pro  Roşia  Montană,  Pro  Dreptatea  and  the  Viitorul  Mineritului  trade  union 
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business  decisions.  The  formal  endorsement  of  World  Bank  directive  on 
involuntary  resettlement  (O.D.  4.30)  by  RMGC  does  little  to  advance  the 
participatory role of local people. Indeed, research on the Antamina project in Peru 
has shown how easily World Bank prescriptions can be circumvented by mining 
companies (Szablowski, 2002: 267).  
Although there are several civil society organizations that allegedly represent 
the people from the Roşia Montană area, when asked which organization or person 
defends their interests, 54 per cent of 82 respondents said ‘nobody’ or ‘I don’t 
know’. Only 37 per cent of these respondents named one or several organizations or 
persons: 20 per cent mentioned opponents of the project and 17 per cent supporters.  
Surprisingly  perhaps,  ninety  respondents  showed  relatively  more t r u s t  i n  
those supporting the project than in those opposing it (see Table 2). Testing for the 
independence of the two variables (supporters/opposition
25 vs. level of trust) using 
the  chi-square  test
26  shows  that  the  two  variables  are  not  independent  (at  a 
probability level of 0.05 with 4 d.f.). In other words, the project supporters enjoy 
significantly more trust compared to the opposition. This is also visible from the 
percentage of respondents who have ‘no trust at all’ in those who supposedly speak 
on their behalf. Here, the difference between project supporters and opponents is 
much more marked than the average levels of trust (column 4 of Table 2). 
 
Table 2 
Levels of Trust Enjoyed by Some Project Opponents and Supporters among the Local Population 
Category of actors  Mean level of 
trust* 
No. of valid 
responses** 
Percent of those 
reporting ‘no trust 
at all’*** 
Project opponents        
Alburnus Maior  3.9  70  50 
Soros Foundation  4.4  49  78 
G. I. (local opinion leader)  4.1  73  59 
Project supporters       
RMGC  3.5  80  36 
Pro Roşia Montană  3.3  73  29 
L. L. (company representative)  3.3  60  35 
* The level of trust is measured on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means ‘very much trust’ and 5 means 
‘no trust at all’.  
** Of the 90 interviews, responses such as ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I have not heard of…’ were removed.   
*** Calculated as the percent of those reporting ‘no trust at all’ in the no. of valid responses.  
                                                 
25 The “supporters” category consists of the aggregated trust values for RMGC, Pro Roşia 
Montană and one company representative and the “opposition” category of the aggregated values for 
Alburnus Maior, the Soros Foundation and one opposition leader.  
26 The results should be interpreted with caution as the respondents do not represent a random 
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Some  respondents  criticize  the  local  NGO  Alburnus  Maior  (AM),  the 
(international) Soros Foundation (SF) and some of their opinion leaders for being 
‘interest  groups’,  for  pursuing  personal  interests  or  for  representing  foreign 
interests. Although nominally a ‘local’ NGO, Alburnus Maior includes numerous 
extralocal activists
27. The opposition is also accused of having no viable alternative 
for development: ‘They keep talking about alternatives [tourism etc.] but nothing 
has been done so far. Why did they think about this only now? The [company] is 
the only certain thing’
28 (M. N., RM).  
The low legitimacy of project opposition at the local level stands in marked 
contrast  with  the  substantial  influence  wielded  by  these  NGOs,  which  have 
effectively  put  the  project  on  hold.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  deep  disconnect 
between  the  risk  bearers  (local  population)  and  the  risk  bearers’  advocates 
(transnational  NGO  alliances)  (Palmlund,  1992).  This  can  be  illustrated  by 
contrasting the risk perceptions and concerns of the locals interviewed with those 
of the NGOs opposing the project.    
The most visible opponents of the mining project, Alburnus Maior and the 
Soros Foundation, are mostly concerned with the physical preservation of Roşia 
Montană.  The  president  of  the  Romanian  chapter  of  the  SF  states  that  her 
foundation opposes the project due to its ‘devastating effects on the environment 
and  on  the  architectural  and  archaeological  patrimony’  (Weber,  2006:  1). 
Endorsing  a broader  agenda,  a  prominent  opposition  leader  describes  AM  as  a 
‘community  movement’  struggling  against  the  proposed  mine  on  ‘social, 
environmental, cultural, and economic grounds’ (T. O.). Following an invitation of 
SF,  Princess  Margarita  of  Romania
29  delivered  a  speech  in  Roşia  Montană 
suggesting that the area could develop through agro-tourism, organic agriculture, 
crafts and cultural tourism
30. This captures in a brief and admittedly simplified 
description the assumptions of the extralocal project opponents.  
However, the reality experienced by the local population is vastly different 
from the image of a community David struggling against a corporate Goliath. The 
‘community’ is in fact divided between a few active supporters and opponents of 
the project, but with the largest share of residents whose interests are tangential to 
those  of  the  active  contestants.  When  asked  ‘what  they  understand  by  risk?’, 
eighty-two  respondents  suggested  a  variety  of  sources  of  apprehension  in  their 
everyday lives. The unknown outcome of the whole project is a reason of concern 
for almost one third of all respondents. M. A., a resident from Roşia Montană 
willing to sell her property to RMGC, voices this feeling: ‘You are afraid that you 
lose your house or the money – or that the company pulls out’.  Interviewees see 
                                                 
27 Among them is Stephanie Roth, a Swiss-born activist who ensured an international profile 
for the AM campaign and was awarded the Goldman prize for grassroots environmentalism in 2005.  
28 The opposition contends, however, that the Zonal Urbanistic Plan (PUZ) for Roşia Montană 
prevented any alternative economic activity between 2002 and 2007.  
29 The daughter of the former King Michael of Romania. 
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risks for those who leave (17 per cent) but also for those who stay (2 per cent). 
Environmental  and  health  risks  are  mentioned  by  12  and  10  per  cent  of 
respondents, respectively. However, 5 per cent consider risk as struggling for a 
better life, while other 5 per cent see a risk in the project not going ahead. Further 5 
per cent see a risk in the current situation (‘the risk of remaining isolated because 
everybody is leaving’ – R.O., RM), while 7 per cent refer to the risk of loosing 
your means of living.  
In all of the above there is no neat distinction between an ideal situation 
‘without the project’ and the ‘end of Roşia Montană’ if the project goes ahead. As 
Guha (2000: 105) puts it, in the Third World ‘reality is a seamless web of social 
and environmental constraints which it makes little sense to atomize into mutually 
exclusively categories’. And, I would add, a web whose internal consistency comes 
under the growing pressure of outside influences.  
AM and SF seem out of touch with the lived experience of local residents. 
However, it is important to understand this claim in relation to the micro-  and 
macro-contexts of the Roşia Montană resettlement. At the micro-level, AM and SF 
certainly fail to take into account the expectations and uncertainties experienced by 
the displacees. Their ‘preserving Roşia Montană’ frames ignore two basic issues 
that  concern  local  residents.  First,  more  than  three  quarters  have  agreed  to 
resettle/relocate from Roşia Montană and for many of them this decision has been 
riddled with both uncertainties and hopes for their future. The lack of sensitivity for 
the concerns of individuals and groups in Roşia Montană is apparent in a statement 
by a prominent extralocal leader of AM. Although he sees AM as a ‘community 
organization’ she claims that if there is one family opposing the project, AM has 
local legitimacy (T.O.). The ‘cause’ of preserving Roşia Montană takes precedence 
over flesh-and-blood human beings.  
Second, AM and SF fail to reckon with the problem that the lack of jobs 
(especially in mining) is a serious issue for displacees and the local population as a 
whole. A similar case of NGOs being oblivious to local needs of employment, at 
the Bujagali hydropower project in Uganda, is discussed by Kobus (2008). While 
78  per  cent  of  ninety  respondents  regard  the  continuation  of  the  state-owned 
mining operation as desirable, such a position is virtually taboo for the project 
opposition. In talking about the workplaces created by the new mine, a leader of 
AM rejects this possibility with profound disdain: ‘And the miners who want to 
sleep  and  drink  palinka  [brandy]  and  think  that  they  can  do  that  with  Gabriel 
Resources [as they did it during socialism], no fucking way’ (T.O.). Even a small-
scale mining project is unconceivable for SF and AM. 
From a macro-social perspective, this cleavage between local and extralocal 
concerns is a manifestation of the peripherialization of Roşia Montană as a whole 
and of individualized responses to risks. Residents cannot set the course of their 
collective  well-being
31  because  this  course  has  been  already  set  for  them  by 
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extralocal forces and they are unable to pursue their common good. They have to 
chose between a job-creating but potentially destructive mine and an ‘agro-tourist 
future’ for those who are able to act as entrepreneurs. From this point of view, AM 
and SF can be seen as the instruments of this latter option. In other words, there are 
overpowering structural constraints in addition to the partly misguided involvement 
of these NGOs.  
INCREASED MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
Although  epidemiological  data  are  not  available,  14  per  cent  of n i n e t y  
respondents mention stress in their everyday lives. Several respondents also refer to 
increased mortality among those who have relocated
32. A local resident says that 
„all those who left regret it, many passed away within two – three months after 
they left.’ (R. D., RM) and another respondent adds, ‘of those who leave from 
Roşia Montană, eight out of ten are dead’ (N. A., RM). ‘They [keep] stressing us, 
people  died  from  heart[attacks]’  says  M.  A.  (Roşia  Montană).  The  structural 
uncertainty which besets the Roşia Montană area is reflected, at the psychological 
level, through high levels of stress.    
CONCLUSION 
By applying Cernea’s IRR model to the problem of displacement at Roşia 
Montană, I aimed to bring a twofold contribution to the displacement literature. 
First, following Dwivedi (2002), I argued for the need to place empirical analyses 
of impoverishment risks within their macro (political economic) contexts as well as 
within their micro (subjective) contexts. This double contextualization is apt to 
reveal more subtle challenges facing displacees and resettlers – such as chronic 
uncertainty  and  vulnerability  –  which  are  not  immediately  apparent  from  the 
application  of  the  IRR  model.  Second,  this  paper  appears  to  be  the  first 
theoretically-informed  empirical  analysis  of  the  displacement  process  at  Roşia 
Montană. Existing publications on this topic tend to take a partisan position on the 
consequences of resettlement. In contrast, this article seeks to present a balanced 
picture of some of the challenges faced by the displacees and the local population 
from Roşia Montană.  
What  are  the  main  elements  of  this  picture?  As  all  mining-induced 
displacements, the RMGC project has created significant impoverishment risks for 
the would-be displacees. The effects of these risks are, however, shaped by the 
micro and macro-social contexts in which the Roşia Montană displacement occurs. 
The  compensation  paid  by  RMGC  for  the  acquired  properties  is  adequate, 
compared to international standards, but there are significant differences among 
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individuals in different time periods. This high level of compensation is partly the 
(unintended) effect of the strong opposition against the project. In fact, the high 
level of compensation is the only insurance against impoverishment, provided that 
relocatees can use it to acquire a new home  and save a significant amount for 
increased living costs in urban areas. Those who have already relocated from Roşia 
Montană  and  have  a  steady  income  source  (pension  or  wage)  appear  to  have 
avoided  the  risk  of  decapitalization.  However,  the  marginalization,  social 
disarticulation and possibly higher morbidity take their toll on some of these relocatees.  
The displacees still living in their homes in Roşia Montană and the local 
population living close to the project footprint bear the full brunt of uncertainty 
created by a very lucrative mining project temporarily halted by influential NGOs. 
Joblessness, resulting from the peripherialization of the Roşia Montană area as a 
whole, appears to be the most pervasive risk. Affecting different groups in different 
ways, the risks of homelessness, landlessness as well as social disarticulation and 
marginalization are part of the everyday lives of the locals.  
The  conclusion  of  this  study  is  less  than  optimistic.  While  individual 
relocatees have managed to escape from vulnerability by moving away from Roşia 
Montană, the ‘community’ as a whole is torn apart not only by the displacement 
induced by RMGC but also by extralocal forces.  These push increasingly towards 
the depopulation of the area and, at same time, make subsistence agriculture or a 
small-scale mining project impossible. The only choice for Roşia Montană is either 
to disappear or to remain, in the words of a extralocal activist, ‘an unequally alive 
museum’, but a museum nonetheless.  
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